Elias Veran, The University of California – Santa Barbara
Introduction
Speaking in Brussels in December 2024, NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte took a novel approach to encourage higher military spending across Europe, encouraging citizens to pressure their governments to increase military spending. Asking directly for the support of “citizens living in NATO countries,” Rutte warned that “danger is moving towards us at full speed. We must not look the other way. We must face it.” As this article will show, people in Eastern European nations may well take on Rutte’s charge. But further West, where daily life continues on with lower perception of the substantial yet relatively distant Russian threat, inspiring people to support an immediate and rapid boost in defense spending is difficult. Is the baker in Rome, or the postman in Paris, truly scared for his nation’s sovereignty and his family’s safety? There is a sort of paradox here — though Russian troops pour into the borders of the NATO alliance, only a small fraction of civilians under the umbrella of the alliance are directly affected. Does Rutte truly expect citizens to have sufficient personal interest in military budgets and future security threats to take to the streets demanding their governments spend more to curb a (seemingly) distant threat? European governments and politicians understand the need to increase military spending, but it can be harder to gather public support for this venture. EU governments spent just 1.3% of their GDP on defense in 2023, continuing the deeply entrenched tradition of prioritizing social over defense spending — a tradition not present in the United States.
As the European face of NATO, Rutte must try to salvage some goodwill from President Trump. The former prime minister of the Netherlands has historically sought compromises between competing political views, and is known to be ideologically flexible. Rutte’s ability to maintain the approval and cooperation of world leaders will be vital to NATO’s continued cohesion and credibility. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy during his first term was coupled with constant criticisms of NATO’s funding disparities. In his second term, American foreign policy seems to have devolved into substantive economic attacks on European allies, further denigrating transatlantic relations.
This article will focus on the cases of three EU nations— Poland, France, and Italy — who diverge in their attitudes towards national defense spending. I will gauge public opinion in each country regarding increased defense spending. I will identify how each government is financing, or plans to finance, its increased defense spending. Finally, I will identify the major problems facing each government as they attempt to build a new security environment and prepare for the potential return of a multipolar world order.
Poland
Poland borders Belarus, Russia’s closest ally. It has increased defense spending by an unprecedented amount over the last decade. Due to its proximity to Russia, the citizens of Poland possess higher awareness and give greater support to military spending efforts. Efforts from Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his center-right party Civic Platform to raise public concern with defense and security have been successful. An April 2025 poll found that 63.3% of Poles feel that their nation’s sovereignty is being threatened, demonstrating the recognition for modernizing and strengthening the armed forces. There is strong public sentiment to not only maintain but increase the already high spending levels, which reached 4.12 % in 2024, the highest contribution-to-GDP ratio in NATO. Approval is strengthened by the Polish government’s commitment to avoid adverse economic impacts on its citizens. Rather than cutting social programs or raising taxes, Poland is seeking approval to use 6 billion euros of funds from the EU’s COVID Recovery Plan on its military. This plan, implemented before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is the largest stimulus package ever in Europe, with the stated goals of advancing scientific research and innovation, fortifying health programs, and driving the transition to green energy. Like other EU nations, Poland has benefitted from receiving billions for its healthcare, infrastructure, and energy sectors. This allowed for a large part of the national budget to be freed up relatively easily, and saw these newfound billions quickly funneled into defense upgrades.
The unprecedented acceleration of military spending means that problematic long-term deficits are likely to arise for Poland, especially since it will spend billions more on maintaining and operating new equipment after the initial purchase. Even with GDP growth expected to pick up in coming years, and lower debt levels than Italy or France, other programs are expected to become squeezed for cash as more of the GDP is diverted to the military. The Polish government has stated that immediate security concerns and expansion of capacity are taking precedence over these future concerns. The state-owned National Development Bank established the Armed Forces Support Fund in 2022, shortly after Russia’s escalation to all-out war on Ukraine. Poland’s national defense budget for 2025 was finalized at nearly 28 billion euros, a massive increase from previous years. Though not immediately risky, the budget does carry “significant risks if the Armed Forces Support Fund is unable to secure new loans or buyers for its bond issues,” a legitimate and even likely possibility. According to the Ministry of Finances, this program is estimated to carry debts of $71 billion by 2027 after taking significant long-term loans to finance military modernization. Clearly, the long-term financial risks will not overshadow the concerns about Russian aggression; the Polish government and people see it as the biggest threat to their safety and sovereignty since World War II. Public opinion may even pressure the government to spend beyond its means in the coming years, and delay the economic repercussions until later.
France
The French Republic is a global superpower, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the unofficial spearhead of the EU alongside Germany. It has increased military spending in the last decade, but the national legislature has often caused hurdles to further advance spending. France has a long history as a global military superpower, a leader in diplomacy and negotiations, and a strong defense industry. The general public is extremely involved in politics, since civic engagement is seen as an important quality. Protests, demonstrations, and strikes occur with a frequency that has created the stereotype of the French people as incessant complainers. Unbothered by this, they see it as an effective and legitimate way to influence politicians and policy-makers. When disagreements arise, parliamentary representatives typically tend to support their constituents over national executives.
Notable conclusions can be found from French public security radar polls conducted in 2025 by German political foundation FES. Despite widespread recognition that Ukraine will likely not defeat Russia, continued support for Ukraine has been widely favored amongst the French public. This is likely for humanitarian and moral reasoning rather than any immediate geographical threat; France sits comfortably further away from Russia than Poland does. There is also overwhelming opposition towards deploying French troops on the ground in Ukraine. France was found to be the most pessimistic country in Europe, a sentiment especially reflected among the younger generations — inflation and rising cost of living is the foremost concern overall, well ahead of war and conflict. Support for a higher military budget came in at 52%, but only 25% favor defense spending over social and economic spending. France went through a political crisis in 2024, stemming from a failed snap election and resulting in a historical no-confidence vote in a spectacle that greatly damaged President Macron’s image and cut his support. To address all-important cost of living concerns, Macron’s government has taken significant loans, with public debt expected to reach 117% in 2026, far beyond the requirement for EU members of under 60%.
Macron’s government is treading softly to avoid drawing further public contempt, which peaked in 2023 after the pension age was raised from 62 to 64 in an effort to increase national production. It has been methodically drawing up a creative financing plan to gain public support for increased military spending. In the short term, “public investors will invest 1.7 billion euros of capital which, thanks to co-investment with private investors, will allow investment of up to 5 billion euros” in support for the defense sector, said Éric Lombard, Minister of Economics and Finance, on March 20. State-owned investment banks such as BPIFrance and Caisse des Dépôts, the investment arm of the French state, will funnel money into the defense sector using the savings of millions of French citizens. This money is not part of the traditional defense budget, and will therefore not inflate the national debt. It will be strategically channeled to national defense firms, aiming to take the number of publicly-supported defense contractors from 40 to around 100 (same source as above). Lombard has also seriously floated increasing taxes on the wealthy, though nothing concrete has been implemented yet on this front. Though military spending is recognized as vital, the French people will not support it if financed through traditional, debt-laden measures. French lawmakers must create and execute an intricate financial plan that avoids social spending cuts and doesn’t raise national debt, while simultaneously ballooning its defense budget from 2.1% to 3% of GDP. Innovative strategies to achieve this are materializing, and failure will see the vociferous French public take to the streets in protest.
Italy
Though Italy’s nominal spending numbers have increased over the last decade, defense spending as a percentage of GDP has decreased. Though a founding NATO member, Italy has consistently spent below the 2% GDP target and has been one of the lowest defense spenders in Europe. Domestic politics are often unstable, with 68 different governments (national cabinets) since World War II. Italy’s proximity to Africa via the Mediterranean Sea meant that illegal migration was the preeminent concern throughout the 2010s, largely exacerbated by right-wing anti-immigrant ideologies, though these anxieties have greatly diminished. In recent years, Russia’s war has come to the forefront of Italian’s minds. The massive production from private companies — Italy has the 6th largest private arms sector in the world — has been a stark contrast to Rome’s failure to increase defense capabilities. Lack of public pressure has surely been a contributing factor to Italy’s lax spending habits, with “Over two-thirds of Italians desire ensuring international peace through other means, such as diplomacy” rather than increasing defensive capabilities. Under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who was elected in 2022, there has been a growing push to boost defense spending, marking a shift from a historically restrained military posture. Protests surrounding major ideological debates and international issues are less common than in France, and tend to receive less widespread support, making them less influential on government policy. Protests are most often driven by public sector employees who feel underpaid. However, the election, policies, and statements of Meloni have sparked increased public demonstrating from young people in recent years, who most notably took to the streets in November 2024 as part of ‘No Meloni Day.’
Meloni, one of just a few European leaders to be an outspoken Trump ally, is keen to increase defense spending to align Italy with his demands. These hopes have been complicated by Italy’s massive public debt, which sat at 135% of GDP in 2024, the largest among major EU economies which makes immediate financing options limited. However, unlike its French counterpart, the Italian government is less responsive to public backlash and has pressed on with its plan to splash 15 billion euros on new aircraft by 2026, collaborating with Italian defense contractor Leonardo to purchase new Eurofighter Typhoon jets. The payment will be spread over several years and is seen as a necessary purchase. Despite this investment, further arms purchases will require adjustments and loopholes. Led by Finance Minister Giorgio Giorgetti, Italy has been a vocal supporter of adapting EU fiscal deficit limits, claiming that the unprecedented security climate necessitates relaxed rules. It is also considering classifying the Coast Guard and some police financing as military to increase its spending to GDP ratio, in an “accounting trick” likely to be rejected by other NATO members.
Though civic engagement may be less powerful than in France, Italy will similarly do everything in its power to avoid cutting social spending. Instead, it is pushing for the only alternative option: gaining exceptions approved by EU counterparts to take on more debt for immediate defense boosts. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has expressed openness to such measures. Meloni’s cabinet still needs to be cautious about maintaining the current level of funding for welfare and social services, but has some leeway to maneuver on military investments even with high debt. As it seeks to reposition itself within the evolving European security architecture, Italy’s limited historical defensive investments and lower public interest will hinder its ability to quickly scale capabilities or assert leadership within NATO and EU defense structures. Its main constraints for stimulating the military are therefore financial and institutional rather than societal.
Conclusion
This article began with a discussion of NATO secretary-general Rutte’s attempts to stir reinvigorated support for NATO’s armament efforts amongst the European public. Before conducting any research, I had assumed that swaying public opinion would be the greatest obstacle to increasing military budgets. It has now become clear that greater institutional barriers also stand in the way. After analyzing three nations with differing social cultures, financial constraints, and geographic locations, it seems inevitable that the alliance will face massive fragmentation issues, even when genuinely intending to collaborate. These fragmentations may not rule out a longer-term transformation, but certainly complicate and delay rapid institutional change in times of crisis. A second Trump presidency was Europe’s greatest fear long before it became reality. Although it was recognized as a realistic possibility for years leading up to November 2024, there was a severe lack of urgency to build increased military spending budgets and innovative financing plans. The repercussions are now being felt, with enormous pressure on European allies to meet huge spending targets that seem like far-off aspirations. Despite being part of a military alliance, these allies are their own sovereign nations and are thus naturally divided on certain fronts. Furthermore, other organizations like the European Commission, European Central Bank, and numerous private and public investors will be key to driving military financing. Of course, Trump has been the most outspoken threat to NATO’s future. But the alliance must not only reform itself amidst unpredictability from across the Atlantic — differing priorities and capabilities from European members, when combined with convoluted financing rules, may well leave NATO’s future in the hands of other international bodies.
The Global Affairs Journal 
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