Beheaded and Dismembered: Postcolonial Violence and Western Interests in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Insurgency

Leticia Almeida, The University of California – Santa Barbara

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Abstract

The Cabo Delgado insurgency in Mozambique is marked by brutal beheadings and dismemberments by Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama (ASWJ, or Al Shabaab). It exemplifies how postcolonial violence is intertwined with Western economic interests. Since 2017, this jihadist uprising has exploited local grievances, such as poverty, youth unemployment, ethnic-religious marginalization, and state neglect in a natural resource-rich region, transforming domestic fractures into a resource-driven conflict. Rooted in Mozambique’s post-independence civil war legacies and FRELIMO-RENAMO rivalries, the insurgency draws on embedded ethnic rivalries. At the same time, it masks economic motives, in accordance with Collier’s market for civil war framework. Western multinationals like TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil exacerbate tensions through resource extraction, forced relocations, and neocolonial dependency, reinforcing ethnic-religious divides through indirect rule via local elites. Furthermore, the state’s weakness has privatized counterinsurgency to PMCs (Wagner Group, Dyck Advisory Group), blurring civilian-combatant lines and violating Geneva Conventions, with widespread human rights abuses including child soldier recruitment and extrajudicial killings. This paper thus argues that Cabo Delgado’s violence sustains global hierarchies, demanding multifaceted solutions: undermining rebel finances, reducing inequality, enforcing accountable governance, and dismantling neocolonial legacies. 

1. Introduction

“Decapitados e equartejados,” or “beheaded and dismembered.” That is how a 75-year-old survivor of an attack in Naguvala, a village on the northern coast of Mozambique, described the way Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama (ASWJ), popularly known as Al Shabaab, fighters were killing civilians in northern Mozambique. Since 2017, this Islamic insurgency has unleashed extreme violence, using both firearms and machetes. However, this brutal conflict reveals a more complex story, one of Western economic exploitation, ethnic division, and the manipulation of local identities in the Global South. This essay argues that the insurgency in Cabo Delgado cannot be understood merely as a domestic civil conflict, but rather as a product of postcolonial hierarchies reinforced by Western interests and sectarian fragmentation. These dynamics ultimately create conditions for instability, extractive dependency, and internal social rifts, serving global economic hierarchies rather than Mozambique’s people.

2. Historical background

Cabo Delgado’s insurgency is rooted in a deep sense of relative deprivation felt by its population. Despite Mozambique’s rich natural gas discoveries, local communities have seen little benefit. Instead, they face persistent poverty, high youth unemployment, and poor public services. This marginalization is compounded by decades of political instability following independence from Portugal in 1975, including a civil war and ongoing power struggles between FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique), the two main parties in the country. The central government, perceived as corrupt and weak, has failed to address these systemic inequalities. Despite being a secular state, 62 percent of the population is Christian, and approximately 19 percent of Muslims, who constitute the majority in Cabo Delgado. This demographic divide, in turn, fuels a sense of religious and cultural marginalization. Accordingly, the Mozambican state’s neglect of Muslim communities, coupled with rising poverty and unemployment, provided fertile ground for discontent, opening up space for religious identity to become a vehicle for political expression and resistance, a pattern seen in many postcolonial states. In this case, internal divisions mirror global power structures, which is what eventually allowed Islamist militants to exploit local grievances and use the religious beliefs of Cabo Delgado’s population to recruit disaffected youth and fuel a violent rebellion.

3. The 2017 Civil Insurgency

Cabo Delgado thus exemplifies how regional exclusion within a postcolonial state can ignite civil unrest. In fact, decades of marginalization led to the emergence of the Islamic State of Mozambique (ISM), an armed group known as Al Shabaab, in October of 2017. The jihadist group had been organizing and growing since the early 2010s, addressing their “Mozambican brothers” and endorsing Quran Laws to gather support from the population. Slowly, they dominated the entire district of Mocímboa da Praia, which became the base for their extremist operations. However, the targeting of civilians to attract attention from the Mozambican government through mass killings and terrorist attacks spread fear and anxiety throughout the civilian population of the northern districts. The current uprising began on October 5, 2017, with a raid on police stations in Mocímboa da Praia. According to ACLED, between 2017 and 2018, Al Shabaab was involved in 66 incidents of political violence, of which approximately 73 percent targeted civilians. These attacks, however, were frequent and included mass beheadings and unconventional methods of killing both civilians and FADM (Mozambique Armed Defense Forces) soldiers. 

Despite humanitarian laws prohibiting the targeting of civilians in armed conflicts, Amnesty International has found that fighters “routinely kill civilians, loot their homes, and then burn them down using petrol” to deliberately intimidate and frighten the population. Hence, as a part of their strategy to call attention to their cause, insurgents not only instill fear and assert control, but also punish, intimidate, and manipulate the local civilian population. However, their campaign cannot be separated from broader sectarian discourses exported from other conflict zones. The Mozambican jihadist movement drew inspiration from Middle Eastern conflicts where religion had already been politicized as a mobilizing tool following Western interventions. Hence, the Cabo Delgado crisis demonstrates how imported sectarian ideologies overlay domestic fractures, transforming legitimate social grievances into violent, identity-based conflict.

4. Rising tensions along ethnic lines

The tensions between Christians and Muslims in Mozambique derives from decades-long grievances rooted in state neglect, government weakness, and economic marginalization. Nonetheless, while the insurgency is strongly motivated by regional grievances, Collier’s “Market for Civil War” text suggests that this conclusion may not be so straightforward. He argues that many contemporary civil wars are actually fueled by economic incentives and criminal opportunities rather than pure ideological or political grievances. Additionally, Collier states that countries most at risk of civil war are those poor, resource-dependent, have a history of civil war, have a substantial minority, and are politically unstable, all characteristics that can be attributed to Mozambique’s government. Accordingly, he argues that these characteristics create the perfect scenario of lawlessness for rebel leaders to prosper during war, even though society as a whole suffers. Furthermore, he claims that “the rebel group needs to stimulate a sense of collective grievance to build cohesion in its army and to attract funding from its diaspora living in rich countries,” complicating the justification of the war as purely economic and political grievances. In fact, in accordance with Collier’s argument, by exploiting local economies and civilian populations, the rebel group Al-Shabaab most likely hid its own true motives, of gaining control over natural resources in the region, behind a facade of grievance of state neglect. The brutality and indiscriminate violence perpetrated by both insurgents and mercenaries suggest that, beyond any initial grievances, the conflict has evolved into a struggle for control over resources and power, with civilians caught in the crossfire.

5. Western influence and postcolonial dependency

Nevertheless, Cabo Delgado’s insurgency must be studied through an analysis of the intersection between structural inequality and Western-driven resource extraction. Since the discovery of major offshore natural gas in 2010, multinational energy corporations from France, the US, and Italy, have expanded their operations in Mozambique. Instead of benefiting local populations in northern Mozambique, these people were forced to relocate. Their lands were taken by energy corporations including TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil, Eni, and Vale, reinforcing Mozambique’s state weakness and reliance on foreign capital after decolonization. This illustrates Mahmood Mamdani’s argument that Western capital indirectly asserts its influence on postcolonial countries through the strengthening of local elites. Thus, this colonial legacy of indirect rule becomes a precursor of rising tensions between Mozambican populations and state vulnerability to the extraction of natural resources. 

Furthermore, religious divisions further fuel the conflict, especially since the Western-allied oligarchies in power since the country’s independence are Christian. However, the northern region’s Muslim-majority has been systematically marginalized from national politics. This created space for groups like ASWJ to exploit economic exclusion of Muslims from the north to frame the conflict as a struggle against a weak, corrupt, and Western-aligned state. This narrative, in turn, is also influenced by foreign networks that emerged after Western interventions in the Middle East and North Africa. Aligned with the Islamic State of Mozambique (ISM), Cabo Delgado insurgents underscore how globalized religious conflicts can easily emerge in weak postcolonial states, by instrumentalizing religious differences. 

6. Western militarization and neocolonialism

In addition, another indicator for the perpetuation of colonialism in less developed countries is the government’s weakness, which results in its inability to contain insurgents. This dynamic becomes evident in the large presence of private military corporations in Mozambique. Unable to contain ASWJ on its own, the government has increasingly relied on foreign troops and private military companies (PMCs), including Russian-linked Wagner operatives and South African security contractors, alongside Rwandan forces and SADC deployments. The government’s inability to sponsor and train an effective armed force to deal with insurgencies forced it to resort to PMCs, or private military companies. Despite the government having two directly-sponsored forces in Cabo Delgado, the FADM and the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) of the national police, due to its weakness and lack of resources, both are poorly equipped and inexperienced troops, making up a small portion of the response to the jihadist insurgency. Instead, faced with mounting insurgent gains and international pressure to secure gas reserves, the government outsourced counterinsurgency operations to PMCs, privatizing a core state function. According to Shearer, this occurs because “the increasing inability of weak governments to counter internal violence has created a ready market for private military forces.” 

However, this decision has only intensified civilian suffering: PMCs like the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) and the Russian Wagner Group operate with minimal oversight, often prioritizing economic interests over humanitarian obligations. Motivated solely by money and not by the local cause, these groups act brutally and ruthlessly in battle, exposed by the Wagner Group’s withdrawal in 2020 after having suffered too many casualties. This is illustrated by the Council on Foreign Relations statement that “this is another example confirming that Russian mercenaries will leave any country where they perceive the opponent to be too demanding and where their presence is neither politically nor financially viable.” Accordingly, just after six months of action, the group was replaced by the South African Dyck Advisory Group to provide air support and train local forces. However, reports have proved that they too act as mercenaries, as 53 witnesses interviewed have accused Dyck operatives of “firing machine guns from helicopters and dropping hand grenades indiscriminately into crowds of people, failing to differentiate between civilians and military targets.” Therefore, the government’s reliance on poorly regulated private military companies, whose operations frequently blur the line between combatant and civilian, ultimately illustrates the impact of western militarization and the forced reliance on foreign actors for aid.

7. Human rights implications

Furthermore, despite being the main targets of jihadist attacks, civilians are also found participating, voluntarily or not, on the rebel side. Influenced by grievances and the religious appeal of Muslims that joined Al Shabaab, many Mozambicans chose to join the war and fight alongside the rebels. Nevertheless, child soldiers are also a crucial part of this organization’s body. Amnesty International has interviewed a former resident of Mocímboa da Praia, who claims Al Shabaab has also taken children: “They take both boys and girls, ages 15 and 16. Some, they take them to behead, some they make the girls become ‘wives’ and do work in the base. The boys become soldiers.” This demonstrates how rebels exploit children’s vulnerability and cheap mobilization to indoctrinate them to fight with no remorse. Consequently, this intensifies the conflict and makes it more deadly. In addition, the uncertainty in international armies about how to deal with children with guns in a conflict also makes it harder to fight them. One example of the use of child soldiers in this conflict is the looting and raiding of the town of Macomia in Cabo Delgado on May 10, 2024, when Al Shabaab used boys aged 13 to loot and engage in the fights against the authorities. Another problem with the use of child soldiers during conflicts is that “despite the fact that more than a quarter of the total troops in the war were child soldiers, neither party admitted it.” This not only hinders the effectiveness of formal demobilization programmes, but also creates long-lasting societal repercussions for the post-conflict, such as persistent poverty and banditry.

There have also been numerous reports of violence perpetrated against civilians by the state side, either directly by the FADM or by PMCs hired by the weak government. A Human Rights Watch has criticized the Mozambican government for being “unable or unwilling to hold accountable members of its security forces implicated in extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, arbitrary detention, and ill-treatment of detainees.” Residents also informed Amnesty International that they are subjected to constant harassment and extortion by police. FADM soldiers have abused civilians they pledged to safeguard. According to witnesses, beatings often appeared arbitrary, leaving victims confused about the reasons behind the actions of their security forces. In some cases, police officers and soldiers accused civilians of supporting Al-Shabaab while carrying out the assaults without providing any proof. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2017, UCDP data claims that state forces have killed approximately 2,500 people in Northern Mozambique, regardless of whether they were insurgents or just part of the terrorized civilian population.

Moreover, apart from direct attacks, the government of Mozambique has failed in its responsibility to the civilian population by not acting according to the international agreements ratified previously. In 1983, Mozambique signed and ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions. By ratifying the Conventions, the government has explicitly consented to protecting victims of non-international armed conflicts, as stated in Protocol II, and to refrain from torture, detention, and attacks on civilians. Yet, FADM and UIR troops routinely violate these norms by torturing, killing, and attacking people without any consideration for their actual involvement in the conflict. Mozambique further fails to guarantee human rights established in the African Charter on Human Rights, signed in 2018, by not guaranteeing that its population receives “humane treatment, protection, and respect at all times.” This data exposes the negligence of Mozambique towards its entire population, attributed to its weakness, instability, and inability to establish a strong bureaucratic state since it became an independent nation.

8. Counterargument

While postcolonial theories underscore how colonialism and neocolonialism structure the relationship between the core and the periphery, some scholars believe these theories overestimate the role of external actors and neglect internal state dynamics. They argue the main reason for Mozambique’s weakness is not the legacy of colonialism, but rather a reflection of century-long political struggles, institutional erosion, and elite competition, which ultimately results in “limited statehood.” Moreover, they emphasize the role of the “resource curse,” a theory that depicts “the tendency of mineral rich economies to underperform in economic growth and other development outcomes.” This phenomena transpires because governments fail to develop bureaucracies and infrastructure because of the revenue coming from natural resources. However, this leads to an increased vulnerability to external commodity prices and overreliance on natural resource exports. Thus, the “resource curse” creates a fragile and underdeveloped state, often prone to corruption. In this case, the insurgency can be interpreted as arising from a crisis of governance where weak formal institutions fail to manage social demands for inclusion, justice, and development.

However, this argument is flawed when tested against the empirical realities of Cabo Delgado’s conflict, where Western economic interests and global power dynamics have direct material consequences. The conflict’s intensity has escalated alongside the discovery and exploitation of offshore natural gas by multinational corporations, displacing communities and exacerbating economic exclusion. Moreover, the weakness of the state is derived from centuries of colonization and exploitation of resources in the country. The long history of Portuguese colonization left enduring legacies that perpetuate the dependency of Mozambique on foreign aid and investment. The instrumental use of ethnic differences by Portugal to divide and conquer the people and territories also fuel the tensions between Muslims and Christians seen in the insurgency. While internal governance issues are undeniably part of the problem, ignoring the instrumental role of Western economic and military involvement obscures the broader structural forces perpetuating the insurgency.

9. Conclusion

Finally, in Mozambique, Al-Shabaab’s brutality and the state’s weakness have created a self-perpetuating cycle where violence becomes a tool for power and profit. For this reason, resolving Mozambique’s crisis requires more than addressing grievances. As Collier proposes, it is essential to undermine the economic incentives that make rebellion viable in the first place, by limiting rebels’ access to financial resources, investing in reducing economic inequality, and providing effective external security guarantees to all citizens, for example. However, while internal dynamics are definitely important to understand Mozambique’s insurgency, it is crucial to look beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. In today’s globalized world, domestic factors compound within a broader context of Western colonization’s legacies and continued influence over their affairs. Global economic hierarchies, established centuries ago and perpetuated until today through neocolonialism, fueled an extremely violent civil insurgency in Mozambique. As multinational corporations extracted natural gas, displaced local populations, and reinforced state dependency on foreign capital and security actors, the West maintained and strengthened their positions in the international system. Therefore, sustainable peace in Cabo Delgado demands a comprehensive approach that critically addresses these postcolonial and neocolonial structures alongside local governance challenges. Only through such comprehensive and accountable efforts can Mozambique hope to break the cycle of conflict and ensure a safer future.