Kathryn Erickson, The University of California – Santa Barbara
Abstract
The 2021 announcement of the AUKUS security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia has remapped the strategic context of the Pacific. The agreement is primarily framed around the sharing of nuclear-powered submarine capabilities with Australia and the advancement of defense technology cooperation. However, its implications extend well beyond questions of regional military security, particularly for small Polynesian island nations whose environmental, political, and existential concerns are directly affected by such arrangements. AUKUS brings into question core principles of regional sovereignty, environmental security, and the integrity of the South Pacific’s commitment to deterrence as established under the Treaty of Rarotonga. While AUKUS aims to counter China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region, many Polynesian policymakers believe it wastes resources and distracts from the region’s greatest threat: climate change. Sea-level rise, increasingly devastating cyclones, and environmental destruction already present an existential risk to the existence of several low-lying islands. Instead of prioritizing climate security, billions are spent on defense. The issue also betrays underlying social and political ties. This agreement is already vulnerable to shattering regional unity in the Pacific. The lack of regional consultation within the pact serves as an indicator of ongoing colonial power disparities, where Pacific nations are valued as strategic assets rather than equals. As of 2021, some countries proceed with caution in supporting AUKUS while others are opposed to any militarization of the region. To understand Polynesian responses to AUKUS, this research will situate local voices within larger global tides, including U.S.-China rivalry, ecological justice, and post-colonial sovereignty.
- Introduction
How can nuclear submarines defend a country that might not exist above sea level by 2050? In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States unveiled the AUKUS security partnership, a pact wrapped in the language of strategy and deterrence which promised nuclear-powered submarine technology to safeguard the Pacific, an answer to China’s growing nuclear arsenal. The Pacific Island Forum has repeatedly affirmed that climate change remains the biggest challenge under the Biketawa Declaration, a framework for coordinated responses to regional crises. Most relevant is the Boe Declaration (2019), with the first first section specifically stressing, “We reaffirm that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific”. Rising seas, stronger storms, and damaged infrastructure, such as fisheries, already reshape daily life in Polynesia. Across the region, more than 90 percent of people live within ten kilometres of the coast, which means even the smallest shift in sea level results in disastrous consequences.
This paper, therefore, seeks to answer the question: How does the AUKUS agreement threaten the political sovereignty, environmental security, and nuclear-free commitments of Polynesian nations? I will argue that AUKUS destabilizes this region of Oceania by undermining regional sovereignty, jeopardizing environmental and nuclear safety, and diverting global resources away from climate security, the most paramount security concern of the region. Any benefits to defense are minimal when the significant threats of climate degradation are taken into account. Ultimately, AUKUS jeopardizes Polynesian security by introducing nuclear risks into historically protected waters, weakening regional sovereignty by excluding island states from decision-making, and diverting resources and political attention away from climate security, the primary threat facing Pacific nations.
- Literature Review
Scholarly engagement with Pacific security has expanded significantly in recent years, especially as geopolitical tensions intensify in the Indo-Pacific. Research demonstrates that the region’s nuclear history continues to influence public trust and political judgement regarding regional norms. Marco de Jong, one of the leading Pacific historians and antinuclear advocate, argues, “In a region living with the legacies of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, Ma’ohi Nui, and Kiribati, there is concern that AUKUS… has ushered in a new nuclearism”. This results in an overwhelmingly negative response to any new nuclear-related initiative, including AUKUS, even when nuclear powered weapons are not directly involved.
- Methods and Approaches
This paper will examine the political and environmental implications of the AUKUS partnership through a qualitative and interpretative approach grounded in the history of nuclear testing in the region and the consequent deterrence policy pushed forth by Pacific leaders, environmental security scholarship, and postcolonial international relations theory. Rather than evaluate AUKUS as a military strategy, this paper seeks to analyze how the agreement is understood and experienced by Polynesiann states whose security priorities differ significantly from those of the pact members’ countries. This, in turn, will assess AUKUS in the context of sovereignty and historical context rather than just conventional strategic metrics. Crucially, this article aims to highlight broader Polynesian responses to the sudden escalation of nuclear arms in a region that made it abundantly clear they were not welcome. The biggest limitation of this approach is a lack of conclusion on the long-term effects of AUKUS as it was only announced in 2021. Considering its multidecade implementation timeline, it remains to be seen if the growing presence of nuclear submarines leads to heightened nuclear risks and further militarization of Pacific waters. The full implications of increased nuclear submarine activity in Pacific waters, particularly with respect to accident risk, waste management, and militarization, will only become clear over time. Nonetheless, the absence of long-term empirical outcomes does not diminish the value of examining early regional responses. On the contrary, these reactions provide critical insight into how Pacific states interpret emerging security arrangements and how historical experience shapes contemporary threat perception.
- Analysis
By reintroducing nuclear threats into a region still grappling with the toxic fallout of past weapons testing, AUKUS revives historical forms of risk and insecurity. At the same time, it diverts political attention and resources away from climate adaptation, which remains the primary existential threat facing Pacific communities, reinforcing long-standing structural inequalities rather than promoting genuine local stability. Taken together, these patterns suggest that AUKUS poses a serious threat to regional autonomy, particularly because Pacific regionalism is grounded in consultation. Pacific leaders expect major decisions affecting the region to be discussed through shared institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare strongly criticized the AUKUS agreement following its announcement in 2021, emphasizing that leaders implementing the nuclear submarine deal had neither provided notice to nor sought consent from Polynesian states. In an address to Parliament, he lambasted Australia’s Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, and Foreign Minister, Marise Payne, arguing that the Solomon Islands’ government only found out about AUKUS through the media, not through any formal notice or involvement.
The following sections will discuss the specific ways these factors play out in the case of AUKUS and the Pacific. The first will look at the ongoing environmental legacy of nuclear testing across the Polynesian region, and the ways that nuclear testing continues to inform and impact the security concerns of contemporary Polynesians. The second will look at the evolution of the anti-nuclear movement and the nuclear-free zone across the Pacific and explore this case as a continuation of a broader political and legal legacy rather than a contemporary issue. The third will explore the issue of global climate change as the preeminent security issue across the Pacific and reasons why the military deterrence outlined by AUKUS is generally eschewed by a community that considers it an ontologically misguided project given the very different threat posed by environmental change. The final section will discuss the issue of regional autonomy and the responses given by Pacific island states and leaders, citing the findings Sogavare offered when prime minister of the Solomon Isles concerning the impact of AUKUS on the exclusion felt by the Pacific community generally. In sum, this framework makes clear that AUKUS is seen throughout Polynesia, not as a means of creating stability, but as a policy that reinforces patterns of militarization and marginalization from the past. By juxtaposing the risk of nuclear weapons, climate insecurity, and exclusion through procedure under one rubric, the following sections will show how AUKUS disrupts the Pacific definition of security, sovereignty, and cooperation.
The Enduring Health Consequences of Nuclear Testing in Polynesia
The political dimension is equally critical. Pacific regionalism relies on consensus and consultation, and particular figures like Greg Fry and Teresia Teaiawa underline that in Polynesia, sovereignty is relational rather than territorial. Addressed through deliberation rather than unilateral discretion, the exclusion of Polynesian governments from the AUKUS deliberations represents a clear branch of regional practice. This is a clear revival of earlier patterns whereby security arrangements have been externally imposed without local involvement. During the Cold War, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom carried out nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, Mo’ohi Nui, and Kiribati without the consent of local inhabitants. Furthermore, the 1954 Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll occurred despite documented regional warnings. Even as recently as 1995 did France ignore express protests from the South Pacific Island Forum to recommence testing at Moruroa and Fangataufa. Hinamoeura Morgant-Cross, a member of French Polynesia’s parliament, would testify that the region was “guinea pigs” for more than thirty years.
The nuclear testing period produced intergenerational health crises, including elevated cancer rates and . Children exposed to these sites showed a heightened risk of thyroid and hematologic malignancies while pregnant women suffered from higher rates of stillbirths and miscarriages; this heightened the psychosocial impact on Polynesian communities leading to fear regarding childbirth and juvenile health that has lasted throughout the decades. Testing governments often denied radiation risks, minimizing harm, which created a strong basis for contemporary skepticism. It is clear that the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines is interpreted by Polynesia through its historical lens. Even though the submarines do not carry nuclear weapons, the reactors that power them raise concerns about radioactive leaks and waste management, especially as there is no clear framework of an emergency response capacity. Pacific states lack the infrastructure to manage a nuclear accident should one occur in their region, and the fragile marine ecosystem of Polynesia makes the risk especially acute. AUKUS not only reopens wounds and trauma from the nuclear testing period, but also directly challenges the core principles of the nuclear-free policy espoused by many Polynesioan countries and made permanent by the Treaty of Rarotonga. Reintroducing nuclear-powered vessels, let alone doing so without the region’s consent, undermines this effort and contributes to what scholars describe as “renewed nuclearism” in the region.
Anti-Nuclear Regionalism in the Pacific
In additional cases, the legacy of nuclear testing in the Polynesian region of the Pacific has created long-term contaminated environments, influencing the trajectory of displacement, degradation of the natural environment, and insecurity for Pacific populations. Scientific research on Maʿohi Nui, the Marshall Islands, and Kiribati indicates that both atmospheric nuclear testing and underground nuclear explosions had a profound impact on island ecosystems because of the long-range dispersal of a range of radionuclides including cesium-137, strontium-90, and plutonium isotopes over the entire ecosystem. These radionuclides strongly attach to soil, coral, and lagoon sediments and enter the terrestrial and marine food. They remain there for tens of thousands and millions of years because of their long half-life cycles. Research conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and Pacific scientists shows that nuclear testing caused immediate physical damage to coral reef structures through the shockwaves and blast effects of detonations. In several atolls, explosions fractured reef frameworks, displaced sediment, and altered lagoon and reef morphology. In addition to this initial destruction, long-term radioactive contamination further degraded reef ecosystems, as radionuclides persisted in marine sediments and biological systems. Together, these impacts weakened the ecological role of coral reefs as natural barriers against storms and erosion and undermined their function as vital fishing grounds, transforming once-productive atolls into environments of chronic exposure rather than sustainable sources of livelihood for local populations. Because the radioactive elements persist, the impact of nuclear testing cannot be considered an event within the history of the islands, but rather an ongoing change in the ecology of the islands.
Analyses conducted on the soil in affected atolls have shown that the radioactive elements are present in the upper soil layers in the islands, where they are readily taken in by the roots of taro, breadfruit, and coconuts, which are key food sources among the Polynesians. Analyses have also been conducted on the oceans, which have shown the accumulation of the radioactive elements in the bodies of fish and shellfish, which remain a steady food source even after nuclear testing has halted. In certain areas, including the Marshall Islands, studies have shown that the soil needs to be excavated or that the traditional pattern of farming needs to cease if the islands are to remain habitable. This effectively makes the displacement of the atolls not an event, but the status. Nuclear contamination displacement has precipitated a cascade of environmental consequences. The displaced community exerts greater pressures on scarce freshwater lenses and already challenged agricultural lands on host islands. Water studies highlight that these pressures catalyze greater rates of water depletion, not to mention saltwater contamination, threatening these islands as a result of rising water levels. Coastal ecologists also suggest that heightened island use precipitates erosion, mangrove deforestation, and decreased island resiliency as barriers to further storm or flood events. All these pressures remain further heightened as a result of rising reliance on imported food sources, as a result of reduced safe agricultural and fishing products. The loss of land is therefore a disaster that is as much about culture as about the environment. When land becomes uninhabitable because of pollution, this ruptures the relationship that communities have with the land and the ecological management structures that have been developed over many centuries. Thus, the environmental after effects of nuclear testing cannot be separated from issues of justice and sovereignty because the scientific effects of the pollution are experienced predominantly by communities that were neither consulted about the nuclear programs they were subject to, nor have they benefited from them.
Climate Change & AUKUS Prioritization
Perhaps the greatest enduring criticism of AUKUS from Polynesian governments is based on a fundamentally different definition of security rather than an abstract geopolitical dispute. The Boe Declaration and UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ caution that Pacific island governments are “on the frontlines of a global crisis they did not create” are two examples of how Pacific leaders have consistently referred to climate change as the “single greatest threat” facing the area. The physical survival of low-lying islands throughout Polynesia is already in danger due to rising sea levels, stronger storms, saltwater intrusion, and rapid coastline erosion. In this setting, security is perceived as the capacity to stay on ancestral land, maintain freshwater resources, and maintain cultural ties to the ocean rather than as defense against a far-off enemy. Long-term investments in nuclear-powered submarines, designed to operate decades into the future, therefore appear disconnected from the immediate, lived realities of environmental precarity and displacement.
Security on Pacific Terms
Together, these Polynesian responses to AUKUS reveal a different approach to security, one that is driven not by theory or notions of deterrence, but by a different set of historical realities and a different perception of risk that matches their physical environment. The repercussion left behind as a result of nuclear testing in the Pacific is one that has resulted not only in nuclear-test affected lands, displacement, and a distrust of external military agendas, but a nuclear-free zone as embodied in the Treaty of Rarotonga. AUKUS is merely further evidence that decisions regarding security strategy for the Pacific are not made through a process involving or inclusive of the Pacific nations themselves. This assessment further reveals that the AUKUS deal is an awkward fit between Polynesian security needs in a time when a crisis challenge of climate change confronts this region as an urgent and existential challenge. Sea levels are rising; there are more powerful hurricanes; and there is a degradation of the ecosystem. In this scenario, in addition to the unresolved issues regarding nuclear testing, this level of insecurity is cumulative and not merely random in occurrence. Traditional military notions of deterrence are of no use in this scenario, and this level of expenditure on nuclear-powered submarine vessels is obviously misplaced in a time when this is a challenge that needs to be met in the context of adaptation, or loss and damage related to climate change. The Polynesian rejection of AUKUS could be seen as a negation of security in general. However, it could be argued that it is actually a call for “security on Pacific terms.” This might mean security premised on notions of survival. The Polynesian view of security could mean security premised on survival. The rejection of AUKUS could be argued to be premised on notions of environmental security. For instance, it could be argued that Polynesians do not see security in terms of deterrence in Polynesia. This view could be argued to be premised on notions of relational sovereignty. Notions of relational sovereignty could be argued to be linked to ideas of security premised on deterrence.
- Counterargument
On the contrary, it is crucial to examine the net positives that international collaboration provides to the Pacific. One might even argue that AUKUS reinforces regional deterrence at a time of peak strategic uncertainty in international maritime jurisdiction, especially as China expands its naval reach and deepens political engagement in the South Pacific. Nuclear-powered submarines could enhance Australia’s ability to monitor regional waters and deter coercive behavior, therefore acting as a protector that provides a more stable environment for small island states. Without this strong Western presence, Pacific nations could become increasingly vulnerable to political pressure such as the establishments of foreign military facilities or predatory economic practices including debt-financed infrastructure projects tied to political concessions, security agreements enabling foreign military or police access, or dual-use port developments with potential military applications.. From this perspective, these developments undermine regional sovereignty in Polynesia more than AUKUS itself.
Yet, there are significant limitations to these counterarguments. For these to apply, one must assume that Polynesian states share Western threat perceptions as their top priority, despite the near-constant assertions of leaders in the region that climate change, not interstate competition, is their most urgent concern. Promised benefits such as technological assistance remain speculative without concrete mechanisms for inclusion, and the use of nuclear-powered submarines for maritime monitoring is at best indirect and at worst counterproductive. Polynesian nations, such as Tonga and Samoa, have long cultivated diplomatic neutrality, carefully avoiding entanglements in the U.S.-China rivalry. AUKUS risks forcing these nations into a difficult position, where they are pressured to align with one side over the other, potentially fracturing regional unity and autonomy. Thus, while AUKUS may offer some strategic advantages from a Western perspective, the purported benefits do not fully address the nuclear, environmental, and sovereignty-related concerns that lie at the core of Polynesian objections.
- Conclusion
The Pacific has already endured a century of imposed vulnerability. That same radioactive legacy is being pried open through the agreement. AUKUS represents a fundamental misreading of security in Polynesia. By centering nuclear technology and great-power rivalry, the agreement overlooks the realities of a region that is facing serious environmental collapse and climate-driven displacement. To reaffirm, AUKUS undermines Polynesian security in three interrelated ways: it revives nuclear risk in a historically free zone, weakens regional sovereignty by excluding Pacific voices from decision-making, and diverts resources away from climate action, consistently identified as the top concern of the region. Nuclear harm in the Pacific is not confined to the past, but persists through contaminated land and reduced adaptive capacity in the face of climate change. Within a broader Anglosphere turn that sidelines Pacific-led regionalism, AUKUS threatens to subordinate Polynesia to Indo-Pacific militarization. The question facing policymakers, therefore, is not whether AUKUS will deter China; it is whether any military strategy can be justified in a region whose primary security threat is the disappearance of its land itself. If security is understood as the ability of peoples to live safely, sustainably, and with self-determination, then AUKUS fails Polynesia on all marks. True security for the region would prioritize climate mitigation and nuclear accountability. Without addressing these foundations, AUKUS risks repeating the very patterns of exclusion and harm that have defined the Pacific’s nuclear past. In this sense, the question remains whether the international community will listen to these voices when they define their forward-looking assessments of survival. Unless the definition of security in the context of Polynesia shifts from militarized deterrence to climate resilience and human survival, there may soon be no islands left to secure at all.
The Global Affairs Journal 
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