Weaponizing Drought: Militant Checkpoints and Revenue in Somalia

Husam Nasser, The University of California – Santa Barbara

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Abstract

When a Somali family displaced by drought gives up almost their entire monthly income, often $50, just to pass militant checkpoints for water access, they show the disturbing shift in conflict economics: armed groups are systematically weaponizing climate change for profit. This article examines how Al-Shabaab—a Somali-based militant group allied with Al-Qaeda—transforms environmental catastrophe into structured extortion, gaining $15-20 million annually from displaced populations. I argue that climate-induced migration has become a profitable business model for militants in fragile states, evident when analyzing checkpoint data, satellite documentation of vegetation loss, and displacement patterns. Evidence shows 78 percent of Al-Shabaab checkpoints gather near severe drought zones, while 30-50 percent of humanitarian aid is diverted before reaching beneficiaries. Comparing Somalia with Afghanistan, the Sahel shows an emerging global pattern—weak governance and climate change equals militant profit. Without intervention—biometric aid systems, blockchain tracking, and recognizing climate extortion as funding terrorism—this risks globalizing the model, making climate security inseparable from counterterrorism.

1. Introduction

Severe drought zones in central Somalia, recorded as the worst in 40 years, have forced over half a million Somalis to give up a majority of their incomes and homes in search of food and water. Passing through Al-Shabaab checkpoints requires fees ranging from $3.50 to $15,000, amounts that consume the whole monthly income of displaced people hardly earning $50 to $90. These are not just random acts of banditry, they represent a structured financial system where armed groups unjustly weaponize climate change for profit.

This raises the question: how do armed groups systemically exploit climate related displacement for profit? I argue that in Somalia and similar fragile states, militants deploy three interconnected systems: strategically placing checkpoints near drought zones, systemically extorting displaced populations, and exploiting weaknesses in delivery aid. This creates a destructive cycle: climate change drives displacement, which funds armed groups, who then prevent state authority from reaching rural areas and tax humanitarian aid, preventing climate adaptation projects and exploiting the population.

The 2020-2023 drought—Somalia’s worst drought in four decades—displaced 2.9 million people, with 79 percent of displacements driven by climate change. This pattern is visible internationally. In Afghanistan, Taliban leaders extract million from drought displaced populations through land seizures and taxation. In the Sahel, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen controls water points and gazing lands depleted by climate change, monetizing resource scarcity. Without disrupting this model, Somalia’s crisis will replicate across fragile states as climate change continues to intensify. 

I am structuring this article into four movements. First, I review scholarship on climate security and aid diversion to identify gaps in how we understand armed group adaption. Second, I analyze Somalia’s checkpoint economy through its structure, scale, and strategic geography. Third, I examine Afghanistan and Sahel cases to highlight the global pattern. Finally, I propose intervention strategies: biometric aid systems, blockchain tracking, labeling climate extortion as terrorism financing, and restructuring humanitarian delivery to reduce militant taxation. The ultimate goal is to raise awareness on this topic and to inspire change, breaking the cycle linking climate change, displacement, and militant financing.

2. Context

Scholarships on climate and conflicts have considerably evolved. At first, studies found no direct causation, but recent research confirms that climate change amplifies conflict risks in fragile states. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change characterizes it as a “threat multiplier” operating through economic shock from harvest failure, agricultural decline, resource competition, and climate change migration. When livelihoods collapse, like pre-civil war Syria, joining armed groups unfortunately becomes economically attractive. In West Africa’s Sahel, militants exploit drought water zones and grazing lands as extortion opportunities.

Yet a gap still remains: scholars have not systematically analyzed how armed groups structure operations around climate displacement as a revenue stream. While predatory adaptation—exploiting crises faster than formal systems respond—is discussed in climate studies, climate change research rarely discusses how militants integrate checkpoint systems, displacement routes, and resource allocation into structured business models.

On humanitarian aid, Simone Dietrich documents that 30-50 percent of assistance diverts in conflict zones before reaching beneficiaries. Her “bypass versus engage” framework shows how donors navigate corruption by channeling aid through governments or non-state actors. Research on the Somalia crisis reveals Al-Shabaab imposes approximately 30 percent taxation on aid in controlled territories, with organizations paying $10,000 in registration fees—“practices remaining commonplace, yet taboo.”

This article connects these literatures by showing how Al-Shabaab links climate displacement, checkpoint extortion, and aid diversion into one revenue system. Using spatial data on vegetation loss and checkpoint locations, and highlighting impacts in regions like Afghanistan and the Sahel, I argue this reflects a deliberate strategy with broad implications for global climate security.

3. Methods / Approach

This article will use a multi-method analysis using both quantitative spatial correlation and correlating it with qualitative case studies. The UN Security Council Panel of Experts reports (2022-2024) document Al-Shabaab checkpoint locations and financial flows, while the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2022 report) gives us a detailed taxation analysis including week-long field observations of free collection at specific locations. Depending on the methods and revenue streams, it estimated their revenue ranges from $15-100 million annually. Nasa’s GRACE Drought Monitoring System and MODIS Vegetation Index provide environmental data, which track vegetation loss and soil moisture during 2020-2023. The International Crisis Group’s 2024 report correlates vegetation loss patterns with Al-Shabaab checkpoint locations using MODIS time-series analysis. In addition, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre data provide tracking of displacement patterns by cause—climate versus conflict-driven—with the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan to show current vulnerabilities and aid needs.

Comparative analysis incorporates filed reports on Taliban extortion of populations displaced by droughts in Afghanistan and implements Shahel data from the Critical Threats Project and State Department assessment of JNIM operations in the region. Severe limitations affect this research: Al-Shabaab revenue numbers remain contested due to the clandestine nature of militant financing; checkpoint counts vary across sources (100-142 reported). Also, 78 percent vegetation-loss correlation claim requires further spatial verification against available data and direct field research in Al-Shabaab controlled zones is extremely dangerous, limiting primary data collection. The analysis relies mainly on secondary sources from humanitarian organizations, journalists, and UN monitors with field access, an approach that would affect the attempt to find the specific revenue numbers and spatial pattern claims.

4. Checkpoint Economy: Structural Dynamics & Scale

Al-Shabaab operates 100-142 checkpoints across south-central Somalia, working as strategic profitable checkpoints gaining money from displaced people, traders, and aid groups. Taxation sources include transit (“gadiid”), goods (“badeeco”), agricultural produce (“dalag”), and livestock (“xoolo”), with fees ranging from $3 per sack of rice to $15,000 for larger commercial shipments. Just one checkpoint at Janay Abdullah collected $61,000+ in a week, coming up to $3.2 million a year. Major checkpoints, such as Kamsuuma bridge, generate $5.5-11 million a year, while checkpoints in other major territories bring in tens of millions annually. According to UN estimates, Al-Shabaab makes $100-200 million annually through checkpoint taxation, port fees, real estate, and urban business licenses in Mogadishu. Geographic placement is quite strategic: the ICG found that 40 percent of Al-Shabaab controlled areas experienced severe vegetation deficits in 2022, indicating intentional positioning in drought zones. In Garbaharey, Al-Shabaab destroyed the main borehole, forcing residents to seek water only through checkpoints. Control of the town Baardheere similarly restricts Joba River access, further creating revenue through restricted access fees where environmental resources become militant profit centers.

The 2020-2023 drought displaced 2.9 million people, with an estimated 80 percent displaced just by climate change! Currently, 3.9 million displaced people live in Somalia, mostly in urban settlements and lack basic services. Families earning $50-90 monthly from UN assistance face checkpoint fees of more than $50, showing  clear economic inflation. CNN’s investigation documented how the system operates: UN cash cards enable internally displaced persons to purchase from traders who must transport goods through Al-Shabaab checkpoints, generating thousands daily from just two checkpoints on the busiest road to Baidoa. Humanitarian funding assistance ends up indirectly funding the militant group through the inflated prices. Water access shows exploitation: prices doubled from $70 to $130 for 10,000L of water, while 300,000 Somalis lack safe water access due to funding cuts, forcing them to rely on private suppliers who pass Al-Shabbaab Checkpoint costs to consumers. Al-Shabaab’s aid earns $15-20 million annually, which is distributed as follows: check point taxation, $10,000 registration fees, and 30 percent taxation on delivered aid value. The UN aims to reach 6 million Somalis requiring $1.42 billion in 2025 assistance, yet checkpoint fees and price markups reduce each dollar’s worth and increases the chances of Al-Shabaab inflating the prices. In Baidoa’s 270,000 displaced population, traders must pay Al-Shabaab taxes despite government control, showing the militants power to tax commerce regardless of any state authority. Even government officials pay; an army commander paid $3,600 to Al-Shabaab for construction material transport through Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab maintains informant networks within ports, notary offices, and real estate sectors, who provide transaction data for precise tax calculations. In Mogadishu seaport, militants obtain a manifest cargo document from compromised officials, coercively taxing shipments even in government-held territories.

Al-Shabaab’s $100-200 million annual income exceeds Somalia’s 300 million government collection, making it one of the world’s best financed terrorist organizations relative to state opposition. The 2024 U.S. Treasury sanctions targeting 16 entities confirmed that the group “generates over $100 million per year by extorting local businesses,” with networks ranging from the Somalian Peninsula to UAE and Cyprus. This destructive and unjust look is evident: climate change drives displacement, displacement funds insurgency, and insurgency blocks state building and adaptation efforts. As Al-Shabaab destroys these water infrastructures and controls access to remaining sources, they simultaneously increase humanitarian need and gain more revenue from attempts to meet that need. They have a strong business model because even when the government retakes territory, Al-Shabaab remains active through mobile checkpoints and city extortion networks, which is fairly easy for them as they’ve grown dramatically. In 2024, when the Somali government froze bank accounts and closed mobile money services, business owners resumed paying within months under renewed threats, showing a clear demonstration of the militants coercive power, even under financial restriction attempts. Attacks on businesses installing government mandated CCTV cameras shows us that government authority unfortunately remains subordinate to militant threats.

5. Counterarguments

It’s important to consider other perspectives, as some skeptics might argue Al-Shabaab’s revenue derives from ideology-driven urban taxation as opposed to climate change manipulation through checkpoint extortion. The Hiraal Institute shows over half of the revenue comes from Mogadishu business paying zakat (donations; a part of Islam’s five pillars), with additional income from port taxation, real estate, and kidnapping ransoms, which are all unrelated to climate change manipulation. These are possible revenue strategies, but it overlooks a central linking point: the 2020-2023 drought coincided with the expansion of checkpoint networks in affected drought areas. Rural checkpoints specifically target displaced populations with no route alternatives, in addition to the ICG data showing 40 percent vegetation deficits linked with documented water infrastructure destruction, demonstrating clear strategic planning beyond just opportunism. In comparison with Afghanistan and the Sahel, it also shows us Taliban and JNIM similarly exploit drought displacement, suggesting systemic patterns rather than pure coincidence.

A second argument would be that Somalia’s conflict since the 1990s explains displacement and militant control regardless of drought conditions. Yet, recent data contradicts this, as showing through evidence in 2020 that 75 percent of displacements were driven by climate change. The 2020-2023 drought displaced 2.3 million people specifically because of climate change, substantially more than combat related displacement. Also, World Weather Attribution confirms human induced climate change increased drought severity, increasing the likelihood of below-average rainfall. The climate demonstrates that it’s the primary source that armed groups deliberately use in their profit strategies. Though these counterarguments acknowledge Al-Shabaab’s other revenue systems and the historical conflict, it undermines the central claim that climate related displacement has become a structured and lucrative revenue system that militants unjustly exploit.

6. Conclusion

When a Somali pays almost their whole monthly income just to pass Al-Shabaab checkpoints for a simple necessity for water access, they clearly illustrate climate weaponization—armed groups systemically profiting from climate shocks. This article demonstrated that Al-Shabaab have taken advantage of climate related displacement and created a profitable model, earning $15-20 million annually just through checkpoint taxation in drought zones. Evidence from Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Sahel real to us a weak global pattern where weak governance with climate stress results in militant profit, creating a destructive loop where environmental suffering funds insurgency that unfortunately limits adaptation. To prevent this, we have to take on three approaches: Biometric and blockchain systems to minimize aid diversion, legal action and acknowledgment of climate restriction as terrorist financing, and organized reforms prioritizing climate adaptation and direct aid delivery. Without action, this model will spread to fragile states, further creating displacement. Bringing forth this topic is only the first step. The imperative now is to translate awareness into targeted, evidence-based strategies that directly disrupt the financial incentives enabling armed groups to weaponize climate stress. Such strategies must be designed and implemented in partnership with the affected communities, whose direct experience is essential for identifying what genuinely reduces both vulnerability and armed groups leverage.