What Is a Hegemon Without Climate Leadership? An Analysis of U.S.-China Diplomatic Influence and Energy Policies

Sophia Vogt, The University of California – Santa Barbara

---

Abstract

This paper asks to what extent the United States’ retreat from international climate leadership has altered its diplomatic influence, and how this shift has created opportunities for China to expand its global influence through climate initiatives. It argues that U.S. climate withdrawal, driven by security dilemma dynamics and power transition anxiety, has eroded American legitimacy within the Liberal International Order. Drawing on such theories as well as policy analysis, including the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and China’s investments in renewable energy, the paper demonstrates that China’s climate engagement strengthens its influence, while U.S. disengagement accelerates diplomatic decline. The paper’s significance lies in reframing climate leadership as central to the future stability of the L.I.O, as U.S. disengagement undermines both their hegemony and multilateral cooperation regarding climate justice, leaving vulnerable countries to bear disproportionate environmental consequences. 

1. Introduction

While President Trump has been “Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements” by pulling itself out of the Paris Climate Accord, President Xi Jinping has built 162 square miles of solar panels in China, and pledged at the U.N. Climate Summit to cut carbon dioxide emissions by seven to ten percent in ten years. With this in mind, the question presents itself: To what extent has the United States’ retreat from international climate leadership changed its diplomatic influence, and how has this shift opened strategic opportunities for China to expand its influence through climate initiatives and exports of clean-tech? Further, what does China’s leadership in global climate initiatives mean for the future of the Liberal International Order? To answer this question, this paper will look at the following topics:

(1) Theory underpinning America-First ideologies and climate denial.

(2) China’s investments in green energy, and emergence as a global climate leader.

(3) The future of global climate leadership and implications on the world order.

Ultimately, this paper asks if  the U.S. can still claim liberal leadership without being a climate leader, and further questions if the U.S.’s retreat from sustained climate leadership has measurably eroded its soft power and diplomatic leverage in multilateral forums, allowing China to strategically expand influence.

2. Theory Underpinning American Politics

The following sections will elaborate upon why the United States is retreating from multilateralism and climate leadership generally, as a result of Machiavellian political theory, the security dilemma and power transition theory.

Machiavelli, the L.I.O, and America’s Turn Inward:

America-First anti-green energy policies largely reflect realist Machiavellian theory of maintaining power, notably that the end justifies the means, as Trump is deprioritizing the soft power of morality that has justified the U.S. led Liberal International Order (L.I.O). Since its adoption post-World War Two, the U.S.-led L.I.O. has characterized international relations through multilateralism, collective security, liberal democracy, and respect for human rights. Much of the United States legitimacy in leading this world order stems from their written commitment to prioritize democracy, human rights, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness— all key tenants of the country’s founding document. However, the U.S. shift away from climate leadership fundamentally undermines these principles, as climate change is on track to devastate the world’s poorest countries. Rather than upholding their responsibility to protect the globe, the Trump administration has shifted focus to protect itself in the face of growing Chinese influence. As such, Washington has resorted to bullying other world leaders into agreeing with American positions, with recent news reporting the intimidation of diplomats to vote against a proposed carbon tax on cargo ships by threatening to revoke visas. This shows a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy towards being self interested as to extend their power and influence for as long as possible and by any means necessary. The U.S. is interested in one thing, to maintain its power, and Trump is largely adopting Machiavellian techniques to make the history books praise his reign rather than lament his process. Johns Hopkins SAIS Professor Ling Chen explains this well, summarizing Melanie Sisson’s book “The United States, China, and the Competition for Control”: 

“Consumed by the narrative that postwar, free-trade multilateralism mistreated it, the United States is gradually giving up on the world it created and increasingly retreating from the postwar order. We have recently seen attempts by the United States to not only isolate itself but actively undermine the very order that promoted peace and prosperity around the globe for decades since World War II.”

The Security Dilemma, Power Transition Theory, and why the United States is Pulling Away from Climate-Crisis Leadership:

Coined by John Hertz, the “security dilemma” describes the condition where states continuously arm themselves in response to another state’s armament, with the purpose of creating security in an anarchic system in which states can not be sure of the other’s intentions. While this definition relates to a power struggle in regards to military strength, the idea extends to economic struggles for power, especially in an era where tariffs act as a foreign policy weapon of influence. For example, tensions between the U.S. and China have escalated in the past decade as a result of Trumpian “America First” policies, by which aggressive tariffs are actively imposed on China to shrink the trade deficit, protect American industry, and decouple economic sectors to fortify America in opposition to China. Trump’s presidency-winning 2024 platform, Article 47, exemplifies this, highlighting the “securing [of] strategic independence from China” through limiting imports via tariffs and generally “countering China” to foster global peace. Trump’s reelection, rooted in promises of tariffs and anti-China political rhetoric, positioning China as the U.S.’s main economic and ideological adversary, confirms the executive’s belief that China is a national security threat. This focus on China as a threat is the basis for this essay’s argument that the rise of China is influencing U.S. foreign and domestic policy to turn inward due to fear of a power transition. “Power transition theory,” essentially describes the anxiety a powerful country undergoes when they experience either a decline in power, or feel threatened that an emerging power’s rise will undermine the hegemon (the dominant power). The emerging powers rise then catalyzes anxiety and directs the hegemon’s decision making to maintain or increase their existing power. Therefore, drawing from both the security dilemma and power transition theory, this essay argues that the U.S. withdrawing from climate initiatives and turning towards fossil fuels is an anxiety induced strategy for short term economic-energy gains, at the cost of climate-threatened global health. 

Power Transition Theory, and United States Prioritizing Fossil Fuels: 

The aforementioned theory of power transition can explain why the United States is turning inward to bolster its domestic energy production via fossil fuels to remain competitive, since China overwhelmingly dominates the renewable energy market. The increased focus on fossil fuel production again finds roots in Article 47, in which Trump advocates for America becoming the “number one producer in the world.” This promise has materialized in the declaration of an “energy emergency,” with energy security becoming an “increasingly crucial theatre of global competition,” due to the “high demand for energy and natural resources to power the next generation of technology.” Next generation tech likely refers to energy intensive artificial intelligence innovation, whose estimated electricity need alone may “exceed the net energy capacity in the U.S. power grid by 2030.” Resultingly, the energy emergency declaration has manifested itself in multiple regressive green energy policies, including the halting and recovering of “funds previously allocated to green banks [institutions focused on financing the transition to renewable energy to fight climate change] established under the Inflation Reduction Act,” the “suspension of renewable energy project authorizations on federal lands for 60 days,” and the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord. All of this has culminated into a 44 percent increase in gas and oil drilling permits since the Biden administration,  and the future forecast of American emissions increasing from 3.6 Gt CO₂ emissions by 2030 under IRA policy, to around 4.2 Gt. The neglect of energy responsibility antithesizes global climate leadership, and exposes the U.S. fear of falling behind China in energy capacity to support Artificial intelligence innovation. It is the manifestation of power transition theory, with the declining hegemon fearing a rising power, and changing their decision making as a result. As such, theory helps explain this puzzling rationale: When the U.S. is behind in energy and interested in maintaining influence through AI development, they continue to lose the clean energy battle in favor of a continuously unpopular and finite solution of fossil fuels. The next section continues to explain domestic political factors perpetuating these policy decisions. 

Status Quo Loyalists; American Domestic Policy Undermining International Leadership:

America First politicians favor the status quo and are avoidant of climate change rhetoric since the U.S. is majorly dependent on fossil fuels for energy production and consumption. Contrastingly, China has been able to more easily integrate green energy into their energy infrastructure because of their consistent view of climate change as economically critical for over two decades, during which they have systematically integrated climate considerations into industrial policy, leveraging their manufacturing base to turn out low-carbon technologies. Such technological innovations include solar cell efficiency and “frontier work on batteries”; both technologies progressed due to increased state funding towards green energy projects.  

Meanwhile in the U.S., shifting towards cleaner energy sources results in backlash from wealthy fossil fuel corporations with deep political links. For example, groups known for their relationships with conservative politicians and fossil fuels organizations, such as The Empowerment Alliance (TEA) and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) on HB 507, facilitate anti-green energy rhetoric through using their intellectual and monetary influence to control members of Congress. Resultingly, self interested status quo loyalists are willing to continue prioritizing fossil fuels and accept climate changes, which will devastate less materially wealthy countries disproportionately—as long as they remain in office through the fiscal and ideological support of such dark money groups, and the U.S. maintains its status as a hegemon under a conservative vision. This reflects a security-centered, power-concerned, self-serving Political Realism strategy by the United States. It is more favorable for politicians to protect fossil fuel industries than it is to acknowledge the real threat of climate change to maintain domestic and international political power, rather than draw attention to renewable energy sources. This will, in the short term, protect politicians’ popularity and the U.S. position as hegemon. However, the long term effects of negating climate change and sidelining the importance of clean energy will haunt America’s status in geopolitics. The next section will explain how U.S. neglect of green energy and climate leadership opens opportunities for China, paradoxically subverting U.S. ambitions of power maintenance. 

III. China’s Role in Climate Initiatives and their Global Implications:

China as a Scape Goat:

To divert attention away from U.S. culpability regarding emissions and climate change, blame is redirected onto China, as previously seen in Article 47, and in claims made by the right-wing Heritage Foundation, a lead organizer of Project 2025. The Heritage Foundation portrays China as “dirty” anti-environmentalists using environmentalism as propaganda. This is confusing for a number of reasons, as not only does it make environmentalism a moral priority, which Republicans actively reject, it also ignores China’s cooperation in the Paris Agreement and adherence to national commitments, demonstrating a more prominent leadership role in addressing the climate crisis than that of the Trump administration. For example, President Xi Jinping has made climate action a key part of the Chinese political platform, stating that “China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060… not at others’ request but on China’s own initiative.” Thus, Chinese actions reflect a climate-conscious government. Ultimately, China has positioned itself as a leader in climate change by participating in climate conventions and adhering to their goals, and distributing green technologies globally.

Unfounded Anxiety, the De-coupling Fallacy, and Separate Spheres:

The American ideology painting China as inherently anti-Liberal International Order with an intention of taking over global hegemony is not supported by Chinese involvement in L.I.O. organizations and political rhetoric. A recent publication from MIT explains the argument of China’s disinterest in taking over U.S. hegemony. Political rhetoric extracted from 12,000 articles and hundreds of speeches by Xi Jinping reveals that “overall, China is a status quo power concerned with regime stability, and it remains more inwardly focused than externally oriented.” Further, they expose how in Chinese discourse there is little mention of “expansive goals or ambitions for global leadership and hegemony” as “China is not exporting ideology.” Significantly, the CCP’s emphasis on “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is not a generalized model for the world.” Additionally, they show that “China’s top leaders consistently reiterate that China does not seek regional hegemony or aim to compete with the United States for global supremacy. Instead, China views international relations as multilateral and cooperative.” Through this research into China’s political intention, the argument arises that China is not positioning itself to take over the American role of I.L.O. leader and global hegemon. Ultimately, the lack of Chinese interest in replacing America as the hegemon reflects how Washington’s anxiety is internally produced and externally blamed.

Further, Beijing is not interested in dismantling the institutions which have facilitated their rise to power, and in which they are active participants, like the UNFCCC for example. Therefore, it is not in the United State’s best interest to retreat from such institutions and allow China’s influence to expand. Brookings fellow Melanie Sisson’s book elaborates upon this idea. Summarized by Ling Chen, Sisson argues: “Given that China has both benefited from and partially invested in the postwar order… it is in the United States’ best interest to bind China into existing international institutions and engage in bargaining over the rules of the game.” Ultimately, retreating from multilateral institutions, and decoupling from China is presented as a political error emerging out of Washington. Carnegie Endowment of International Peace fellows Chivvis and Kaptein agree, explaining how the U.S.-led decoupling is the most “destabilizing approach” as it will subvert international cooperation through the creation of separate spheres of influence. This will force nations globally into choosing a side with which to align and undermine a globalized effort to combat climate change. This is because it subverts international participation in the systems that uphold and perpetuate the L.I.O. and international initiatives regarding climate, such as UNEP and their Framework Convention on Climate Change. While this undermines the fight against climate change, it also damages American hegemony, which is largely sustained by the normative power of the L.I.O.. The security-dilemma and power-transition-inspired decoupling of America from China is thus bad for the United States as it weakens the multilateral institutions which give it power and also provide more opportunity for China to create a separate sphere of influence. Separate spheres oppose the American goal of maintaining its global influence and protecting against the spread of authoritarianism.

The expansion of Chinese influence, especially in regards to green energy developments is already seen in countries, including but not limited to Brazil, India, Vietnam, Nepal, Nigeria, Morocco, and Chile. This is possible due to China’s lead in green energy, and their capacity to export billions of dollars of technology and infrastructure. Resultingly, “Chinese industrial policy is shaping the development trajectory of some of the world’s fastest-growing economies.” Meanwhile, the United States has withdrawn itself from multilateral institutions and agreements, such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP): “A platform for developed nations to aid developing nations transition from coal to clean energy.” Essentially, JETP is an agreement facilitating the fair exchange of resources and responsibility between developed nations and developing nations who have contributed the least to climate change yet suffer the most consequences, for the purpose of helping those developing. The U.S. withdrawal from JETP not only removes resources from developing nations, but also undermines U.S. leadership, accountability, and influence. Countries then turn to China for help, expanding Beijing’s global reach and authority. Consequently, increased Chinese activity in developing countries allows for an increase in authoritarianism, as bilateral agreements with China under the ‘Beijing Consensus’ have less strict conditions for funding that the ‘Washington Consensus.’ The Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus are essentially two schools of thought regarding state development and international aid, with the Washington Consensus having strict guidelines meant to facilitate the growth of democracy and limit the spread of authoritarianism. With this transfer of international development influence from the U.S. to China, a core L.I.O. tenant is undermined—that tenant being to develop nations responsibly under the oversight of democratic standards. The U.S. giving away their seat in global development to China subverts the U.S. principle of protecting democracy and human rights, which gives the U.S. credibility as the world leader. Ultimately, the U.S. declining climate leadership and turning away from the mission of providing life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness globally undermines their credibility internationally, and weakens U.S. hegemony.

IV. Counterarguments

A counter argument supporting the vilification of China finds footing in weaknesses of the M.I.T. paper’s research methods, since it draws upon public speeches and newspapers. Such mediums that were analyzed are in nature performative, and can not reveal authentic intentions of the Chinese government reliably. Additionally, scholars like Ryan Hass complicate the “status quo China” argument, noting that while China participates in institutions like the WTO and IMF, it simultaneously rejects constraints that would keep the liberal economic system functional, and has repeatedly ignored international rulings on issues such as the South China Sea. These contradictions make it difficult to trust assessments that portray China as entirely uninterested in expanding influence or challenging existing norms. However, this uncertainty does not negate the broader point that U.S. withdrawal from climate leadership remains strategically self-damaging. Regardless of China’s intentions, the U.S. decision to deprioritize climate action is costing it credibility, especially among developing countries that increasingly look to China for green technology and financing. Even if China’s ambitions are unclear, the reality is that their renewable energy expansion is strengthening Beijing’s global influence, while the U.S. weakens. Thus, skepticism about China’s stated intentions does not undermine the argument that American climate inaction is accelerating its diplomatic decline.

Another counterargument relates to China not “stepping into the vacuum” left in the absence of the U.S. and their lack of climate leadership. After the 2025 COP30 conference in Brazil, the climate science and diplomatic community expressed frustration with China’s lack of leadership or interest in becoming a global climate leader. At the conference, China “avoided strong positions on the need to prevent the planet from dangerously warming…. is not promising to more aggressively reduce the greenhouse gases it generates…  and has declined to offer more money to help poor countries cope [with] climate change.” First, it is interesting to note that China is not interested in this leadership position, supporting the above argument regarding China’s lack of desire for stepping into the U.S.’s role in international relations. But secondly, and more related to the counterargument at hand, while China has not made any stunning, leaderly positions on the international stage, the way the country addresses climate change, is positively visionary. In their 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions to climate change, Xi Jinping asserted:  

“Green and low-carbon transition is the trend of the time. While some country is acting against it…” (‘country’; possibly a dig at the U.S.) “…the international community should stay focused on the right direction, remain unwavering in confidence, unremitting in actions and unrelenting in intensity, and push for formulation and delivery on NDCs, with a view to providing more positive energy to the cooperation on global climate governance.”

Second, Xi called for more advanced economies to take responsibility for the havoc climate change poses towards less developed nations, stating: 

“Fairness and equity should be upheld and the right to development of developing countries fully respected.”

Xi Jinping’s statements hold the rhetoric of leadership in the face of the United States’ disregard of climate change altogether, having withdrawn from the UNFCCC, JETP, and generally anti green-energy domestic policies. Further, Chinese contributions to international disbursement of green energy outside of the UNFCCC display climate leadership. Even if China has not wanted to claim the role of global climate leadership, their awareness of and participation in climate change policy and infrastructure has given leadership to them. Whether or not they are good climate leaders is another topic to analyze. Rather, the argument here is the United States’ withdrawal from green energy and climate policy, internationally and domestically, weakens their long-term authority by allowing China to dominate in green-energy, stake claims in developing countries, and gain international recognition. Ultimately, China has done so, while the U.S. has retreated inward, hoping to maintain hegemony through irresponsible fossil fuel use and diplomatic bullying.

V. Conclusion

Washington’s fixation on Beijing as an existential rival has created a destructive political strategy that ultimately undermines American interests through rejecting clean energy. This essay has argued that the United States’ retreat from climate leadership is not an isolated policy failure but a symptom of a broader anxiety about a possible power transition in China’s favor that fuels decoupling, erodes multilateral institutions, and weakens the Liberal International Order the U.S. claims to defend. If the United States intends to maintain its legitimacy as the leader of the Liberal International Order and the global defender of democracy, it must recognize that climate change, not China, is the most urgent threat to human security. Even in the inevitable AI-energy battle with China, prioritizing fossil fuels accelerates long-term decline, particularly as China expands its influence by exporting affordable renewable technologies and financing clean energy transitions across the Global South. The more the U.S. disengages from climate initiatives, the more it forfeits diplomatic relevance to China in regions that will shape the next century. Authoritarianism will be allowed to develop. Moving forward, the United States must abandon its impulse to decouple for the sake of countering China and instead pursue cooperative climate engagement that strengthens multilateral institutions and restores global trust. Climate leadership is not a peripheral issue, it is the arena in which future power and legitimacy will be determined. Without a serious recommitment to clean energy, international cooperation, and climate justice, the United States risks losing influence, credibility, and ultimately the stability of the world order it helped build. What is at stake is democracy and the possibility of a habitable future. Ultimately, the United States can not claim morally legitimized diplomatic superiority in international relations without upholding the commitment of democracy and the right to life—life which is existentially threatened by climate change.